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Casenotes

Rainey v. Chever: Expanding a Natural

Father's Right to Inherit from His
Illegitimate Child

In Rainey v. Chever,' the Georgia Supreme Court held unconstitutional section 53-2-4(b)(2) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A."), 2 which required that before a natural father could inherit
through his illegitimate child, the natural father had to either openly
treat the child as his own or provide support for the child.3 Coming up
only one vote short, the United States Supreme Court denied plaintiff's
petition for writ of certiorari. 4 The three dissenting Justices declared
their belief that Georgia's statute addressed the "alarming trend" of outof-wedlock births.5 Furthermore, the dissenting Justices asserted that
because of the "substantial tension" between Georgia's decision and the
United States Supreme Court's decisions, certiorari should have been
granted.'

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

270 Ga. 519, 510 S.E.2d 823, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2411 (1999).
270 Ga. at 519, 510 S.E.2d at 824.
O.C.G.A. § 53-2-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1999).
119 S. Ct. at 2411.
Id.

6. Id. at 2414.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Zenobia Hamilton Rainey gave birth to DeAndre Bernard Hamilton,
but was not married to DeAndre's biological father, Robert Lee Chever.
When DeAndre was about two years old, Chever established his
paternity through a judicial proceeding. 7 However, this judicial
proceeding did not legitimate DeAndre. s Although Chever lived less
than one mile from DeAndre, Chever had no contact with DeAndre. In
fact, DeAndre instigated the first contact with Chever when DeAndre
was fifteen years old. Even after this contact, Chever did not take an
active role in DeAndre's life. Chever did not visit DeAndre or pay
Rainey any child support. Furthermore, Chever did not know when or
if DeAndre graduated from high school or if he attended college. In
August 1997, at age twenty, DeAndre was killed in an automobile
accident that was allegedly caused by a manufacturing defect. 9 Despite
having so little contact with DeAndre, Chever was "the first person-of
all the parents whose children were injured or killed-to file a suit
seeking monetary damages for his death."10
Believing that Chever had no right to inherit from DeAndre and
attempting to stop Chever from pursuing his wrongful death action,
Rainey filed a Petition to Determine Interests of Heirs pursuant to
section 53-2-4(b)(2) of the O.C.G.A." Rainey then moved for summary
judgment on the ground that Chever failed to meet the requirements of
section 53-2-4(b)(2). Reasoning that Rainey relied upon a statute that
was unconstitutional under the constitutions of both Georgia and the
United States, Chever replied with a cross-motion for summary
judgment. The trial court granted Chever's motion and held that section
53-2-4(b)(2) violated the constitutions of Georgia and the United States.
The trial court found that section 53-2-4(b)(2) used an unconstitutional
gender-based classification because it placed additional requirements
upon a father of an illegitimate child before that father could inherit
from his child. 12 However, the mother of the same child had no such
7. 270 Ga. at 519, 510 S.E.2d at 823.
8. Establishing the paternity of a child does not give the father the same parental
rights as does legitimating a child. One example of that principle is found in O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-25 (1999), which gives exclusive paternal control of a child born out of wedlock to
the mother unless the child is legitimated by the father.
9. 119 S. Ct. at 2411.
10. Id.
11. Telephone interview with Kenneth Shigley, counsel for Rainey (Oct. 29, 1999).
12. 270 Ga. at 519, 510 S.E.2d at 823. Those additional requirements are that "the
father must not have failed or refused openly to treat the child as his own or failed or
refused to provide support for the child." Id., 510 S.E.2d at 824.
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additional requirements to inherit from her child." The trial court
further stated that "there is no legitimate state interest achieved by not
subjecting mothers of illegitimate children to the same standards of
conduct."14
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous decision. 5
Rainey petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, but
the 1Court
narrowly denied the petition, with three Justices dissent6
ing.

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

Statutory History
Prior to April 1991, the biological father of a child born out-of-wedlock
could inherit from that child if the child had been legitimated or if
paternity had been judicially established, and the mother of the child
could inherit as if the child were legitimate. 7 Georgia House Bill 251,
which was approved on April 10, 1991, amended this provision." This
amendment renumbered section 53-2-4 and added subsection (b)(2),
which sets forth requirements that a biological father must meet to
inherit from his out-of-wedlock child. 9 New subsection (b)(2) requires
not only that the child be legitimated or paternity established, but also
that the biological father prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
while the father was living and following the child's birth, he "openly

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 521, 510 S.E.2d at 825.

16. 119 S. Ct. at 2411.
17. The predecessor of section 53-2-4(b)(2), O.C.G.A. § 53-4-5, stated,
(a) The mother of a child born out of wedlock... may inherit from and through
the child born out of wedlock in the same manner as if the child were legitimate.
(b) The father of a child born out of wedlock... may inherit from and through
the child born out of wedlock in the same manner as if the child were legitimate
if a court of competent jurisdiction, during the lifetime of the father and after the
conception of the child, has entered an order declaring the child to be legitimate
under the authority of Code Section 19-7-22 or such other authority as may be
provided by law, or has otherwise entered a court order establishing the father of
the child born out of wedlock. If no such order has been entered, neither the
father nor any paternal kin may inherit from the child born out of wedlock by
reason of the paternal kinship.
1988 Ga. Laws 1720, 1732.
18. 1991 Ga. Laws 660, 662.
19. Id. at 663.
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20
treat[ed] the child as his own" and "provide[d] support for the child."
Subsection (b)(2) was further amended in 1996 with the deletion of the
21
phrases "while the father was living" and "following the child's birth."
After the Georgia Supreme Court decided Rainey, Georgia House Bill
366 was introduced in an effort to amend section 53-2-4(b). 2' The latest
version of House Bill 366 would reduce the requirements for a biological
father to inherit from his out-of-wedlock child by deleting the obligation
of the father to treat the child openly as his own or to provide support
for the child.23 If approved by the Senate, the new version of section
53-2-4(b) would allow the father of a child born out of wedlock to inherit
through that child if the father does only one of the following: legiti-

20. Id. Paragraph (b)(2) stated in full:
Paragraph (1) of this subsection notwithstanding, neither the father nor any
paternal kin shall inherit from or through a child born out of wedlock if it shall
be established, by a preponderance of evidence, that the father, during his lifetime
and after the birth of the child, failed or refused to openly treat the child as his
own or failed or refused to provide support for the child.
Id.
21. 1996 Ga. Laws 504, 532. Subsection (b)(2) now reads,
Paragraph (1) of this subsection notwithstanding, neither the father nor any child
of the father nor any other paternal kin shall inherit from or through a child born
out of wedlock if it shall be established by a preponderance of evidence that the
father failed or refused openly to treat the child as his own or failed or refused to
provide support for the child.
Id.
22. See H.R. 366, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999), availableat <http://www2.state.ga.us/Legis/1999_00/leg/fulltextlhb366.htm>.
23. See id. § 1. If the bill is approved, O.C.G.A. § 53-2-4(b) would read:
The father of a child born out of wedlock... may inherit from and through the
child born out of wedlock in the same manner as if the child were legitimate if:
(1) A court of competent jurisdiction has entered an order declaring the child to
be legitimate under the authority of Code Section 19-7-22 or such other authority
as may be provided by law;
(2) A court of competent jurisdiction has otherwise entered a court order
establishing paternity;
(3) The father has, during the lifetime of the child, executed a sworn statement
signed by the father attesting to the parent-child relationship;
(4) The father has, during the lifetime of the child, signed the birth certificate
of the child; or
(5) The presumption of paternity described in division (2)(B)(ii) of Code Section
53-2-3 has been established and has not been rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.
Id. This bill passed the House on March 4, 1999 and was sent to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on March 8, 1999. Because the General Assembly's 1999 Regular Session
adjourned with no action taken on the bill, the bill was carried over to the 2000 Regular
Session. As of April 10, 2000, the Senate Judiciary Committee had not acted on the bill.
Telephone Interview with Senator Kemp's Office (Apr. 10, 2000).
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mates the child, establishes paternity, signs an affidavit acknowledging
that he is the father of the child, or signs the child's birth certificate.24
The pre-1990 version of the Uniform Probate Code mirrored section
53-2-4; however, the Uniform Probate Code was revised and now
provides that "[i]nheritance from or through a child by either natural
parent or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless that natural parent
has openly treated25 the child as his [or hers], and has not refused to
support the child."
B.

Caselaw History

Although it is now firmly established that an intestacy statute cannot
discriminate on the basis of legitimacy and, therefore, that an illegitimate child has the right to inherit from his or her natural parents, this
has not always been so. In Johnstone v. Taliaferro,8 the Georgia
Supreme Court discussed the rights and status of illegitimate children
and stated that "[tihe most important disability of an illegitimate child
at common law is that he has no inheritable blood; that he is incapable
of becoming [an] heir ... ; [and] that he can have no heirs but those of
his own body."27 The court stated that several statutes passed in the
1800s had upgraded the rights and status of illegitimate children so that
by the turn of the century an illegitimate child had inheritable blood and
could inherit from his or her mother and vice versa. 2' However, as at
common law, an illegitimate child was still not able to inherit from the
biological father, and the child had no paternal heirs unless the child
was legitimated.2 9
In 1970 the Georgia Supreme Court stated in Pettiford v. Frazier"
that the legislature had the authority to determine whether and how an
illegitimate child could inherit from the mother and father.3 1 In
reaching this decision, the court reasoned that inheritance rights are not
"natural and inalienable right[s], guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States."32 Therefore, "'the legislature may change, condition, or
abrogate the law of succession, subject to certain constitutional
limitations which are restricted in their scope.' 33 The court cautioned

24.
25.
26.
27.

See supra note 23, § 1.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (amended 1990), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 91 (1998).
107 Ga. 6, 32 S.E. 931 (1899).
Id. at 13, 32 S.E. at 934.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 16, 32 S.E. at 935.
Id.
226 Ga. 438, 175 S.E.2d 549 (1970).
Id. at 439, 175 S.E.2d at 550.
Id.
Id. (quoting 23 AM. JUR. 2D Descent & Distribution § 13, at 759-61).
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that although the United States Constitution does not limit the power
of state legislatures to establish and amend inheritance laws, the
Fourteenth Amendment would suppress the legislature's power if such
power "'would be so obviously arbitrary and unreasonable as to be
beyond the pale of governmental authority.'"34' Therefore, the court
concluded that while the common law gave no right to the illegitimate
child to inherit, the legislatures of each state have the power and
an illegitimate child could
discretion to decide under what circumstances
35
inherit from his or her mother and father.
In Poulos v. McMahan, 6 the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed
Georgia's intestacy laws as they pertained to the right of an illegitimate
child to inherit from the father. In Poulos an illegitimate child, Michael,
was attempting to inherit from his father. The probate court found that
Michael was indeed the decedent's child; however, the superior court
granted the opposing side's motion for summary judgment.3 7 The
superior court found that because Michael was an illegitimate child, he
"could not inherit from the decedent under the intestacy laws in effect
at the time of the decedent's death."31 Michael appealed, arguing that
Georgia's intestacy statutes were unconstitutional because they
discriminated against illegitimate children, and the supreme court
agreed that the pre-1980 intestacy scheme "granted illegitimate children
no inheritance rights against their fathers' estates."39 The court
further stated that the intestacy scheme was subsequently revised to
allow an illegitimate child to inherit from the father if paternity had
been established during the lifetime of the father and after the
conception of the child.40 But because Michael had not met the requirements of the amended intestacy statute during the lifetime of his father,
the court did not allow him to inherit from his father.4 '
When a putative father attempted to inherit from his illegitimate
daughter who had died intestate, the Georgia Court of Appeals
prohibited the father from inheriting because the requirements of section
53-4-5(b) (now section 53-2-4) had not been met during the child's
lifetime.42 Although the court based its decision on the father's not

34. Id., 175 S.E.2d at 551 (quoting 23 AM. JUR. 2D Descent & Distribution§ 13, at 759-

61).

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
250 Ga. 354, 297 S.E.2d 451 (1982).
Id. at 354, 297 S.E.2d at 452.
Id.

39. Id. at 359, 297 S.E.2d at 455.

40. Id. at 360, 297 S.E.2d at 456.
41. Id. at 364, 297 S.E.2d at 458.
42. Dunlap v. Moody, 224 Ga. App. 38, 40, 479 S.E.2d 456, 458 (1996).
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meeting the requirements of subsection (b)(1) of the statute (establishing
paternity), the court stated that subsection (b)(2) also had not been
met.43 The father argued that he "occasionally exchanged gifts with
[the child]," but the court found that "occasional gifts do not constitute
support."" Furthermore, the evidence showed the father's lack of
monetary support, his failure to be present at the child's birth, and his
lack of contact with the mother and child during the first two to three
years of the child's life.45 Therefore, the father was not permitted to
inherit from his out-of-wedlock child because the father did not establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that he had supported the child and
had openly treated the child as his own.46
III. RATIONALE OF THE COURT
The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously held in Rainey that section
53-2-4(b)(2) is unconstitutional under both the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph II
of the Georgia Constitution of 1983."' The court reasoned that because
there is "no 'exceedingly persuasive' justification for treating the
inheritance rights of mothers and fathers of children born out of wedlock
differently," the statute creates an unconstitutional gender-based
classification."
Although the State (through amicus curiae) and the mother argued
that this statutory provision "distinguishes not between mothers and
fathers but between fathers who treat their illegitimate child as their
own and those who do not," the court dismissed this argument and found
that the statute creates a "gender-based classification." 9 The court
seemed concerned that subsection (b)(2) imposed an additional obligation
upon fathers but not upon mothers-that obligation being that the father
must not have failed or refused to treat the child openly as his own or
failed or refused to provide support for his child. 50 Therefore, because
a mother of a child born out of wedlock could inherit from or through
that child without having to prove that she had openly treated the child
as her own and had provided support for the child, and because of the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 40-41, 479 S.E.2d at 458-59.
Id. at 40, 41, 479 S.E.2d at 459.
Id. at 40-41, 479 S.E.2d at 458-59.
Id.
270 Ga. at 519, 510 S.E.2d at 824.
Id. at 520-21, 510 S.E.2d at 824-25.
Id. at 519, 510 S.E.2d at 824.
Id. at 519-20, 510 S.E.2d at 824.
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plain language of subsection (b)(2), the court found that the statute
created a gender-based classification.51
The court then turned to the issue of whether this gender-based
classification was constitutional. Relying on prior decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the court first noted that "[glender-based
classifications are subject to a strong presumption of constitutional
invalidity" and that such a classification would be unconstitutional
"unless the classification furthers important governmental objectives,
and the discriminatory means employed are 'substantially related' to the
achievement of those governmental objectives."52 The court further
explained that the "justification for making a gender-based classification
proffered by the State must be 'exceedingly persuasive,' genuine, and not
hypothesized, and it 'must not rely on overbroad generalizations about
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females. '"53
Relying on guidance from the United States Supreme Court, the court
agreed with the mother's and State's contention that Georgia has an
important interest in "encouraging fathers to take responsibility for their
children born out of wedlock and encouraging parental responsibility by
precluding an uninvolved father from profiting from the death of a child
born out of wedlock."54 However, the court also found that such an
interest was not enough to validate the gender-based classification
because "the State has an equally important interest in encouraging the
identical behavior in mothers."55 Furthermore, the court rejected the
justification that "mothers are less likely than fathers to abandon
children born out of wedlock" because that argument relied on "stereotypes and overbroad generalizations." 6
Attempting to support the constitutionality of the statute, the State
relied on Parham v. Hughes," a five-to-four United States Supreme
Court decision that affirmed a Georgia Supreme Court decision that a
Georgia statute precluding a father from suing for the wrongful death
of his illegitimate child was constitutional.5" The State argued that in
Parham the Court distinguished between statutes that classify based on

51. Id.
52. Id. at 520,510 S.E.2d at 824 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34
(1996); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76(1971); Franklin v. Hill, 264 Ga. 302, 303, 404 S.E.2d
778, 780 (1994)).
53. Id. (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533) (citation omitted).
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.

57. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
58. Id. at 348, 350, 359.
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action and statutes that classify based on status.59 Because section 532-4 "singles out those fathers who have taken no action during the life
of their children," the State urged that the statute does not discriminate
against fathers because of "gender, which is immutable," but rather is
"based on [their] action" or lack thereof.6" The court dismissed the
State's arguments in Rainey and stated that Parham was concerned with
"avoiding problems in proving paternity," a problem that is not present
under the Georgia statutes because section 53-2-4(b)(1) sets forth the
requirement "that the
father judicially establish paternity prior to the
6
death of the child."
Although the United States Supreme Court denied plaintiff's petition
for writ of certiorari on June 24, 1999, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.6 2 Justice Thomas wrote the
dissenting opinion and stated that "[tihe facts of this case poignantly
illustrate the problem that Georgia sought to address" when it amended
section 53-2-4(b)(2) to add requirements for a natural father to inherit
from or through his out-of-wedlock child. 3 Justice Thomas noted the
affidavits of Patrick Fagan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Family and Social Services Policy of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, and State Representative William C.
Randall, Chairman of the Special Judiciary Committee of the Georgia
House of Representatives and sponsor of section 53-4-5(b)(2) (now section
53-2-4(b)(2)).64 Justice Thomas stated that those affidavits illustrated
Georgia's "alarming trend" of "out-of-wedlock births and delinquent
fathers" and the "dire social consequences" that result.65 The dissenting Justices believed that Georgia was attempting to prevent the
situation in which a child is born out of wedlock, the father does not
form a "substantial parental relationship" with the child or support the
child, but then "seek[s] to profit from the death of the child."66
Justice Thomas stated that the Georgia Supreme Court's decision
"arguably is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions and, at a
minimum, resolves an important question warranting this Court's
review. " 6 The dissent was first concerned with the Georgia Supreme

59.
(1999)
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of Georgia at 5, Rainey v. Chever, 270 Ga. 519
(No. 98-1478).
Id. at 6.
270 Ga. at 520-21, 510 S.E.2d at 825.
119 S. Ct. at 2411.

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2412.
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Court's apparent application of intermediate scrutiny.68 Relying on
Quilloin v. Walcott, 9 Parham, and Lehr v. Robertson,v° the dissent
declared that "the lower court's choice of heightened scrutiny, particularly in this case, appears to be in error."71
The dissent proceeded on the assumption that the Georgia Supreme
Court "correctly chose heightened scrutiny," but noted that even under
that assumption, "its application of that standard is equally dubious."72
The dissent stated that the Georgia Supreme Court's reliance upon only
one page from one case, Miller v. Albright," to "conclu[de] that § 53-24(b)(2) was not substantially related to important governmental
interests" was "misplaced for several reasons. 7 First, "[tihere was no
opinion for the Court in Miller; rather six justices, in three different
Furthermore, "the
opinions, affirmed a lower court judgment." 5
plurality opinion ... actually concluded that the statute at issue was not
based on impermissible stereotypes, reasoning that '[tihe biological
differences between single men and single women provide a relevant
basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on
children born in foreign lands.'" 76 Therefore, Justice Thomas declared
that Miller "does not stand for the proposition that all generalizations
based on gender are constitutionally infirm."77
The dissenting Justices were also "at a loss to understand how the
Georgia Supreme Court's decision can be squared with [the Supreme]
Court's decisions recognizing women's unique role in childbirth."78 The
dissent examined PlannedParenthoodof CentralMissouri v. Danforth79
and Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,0 both
of which stated that courts should not ignore a woman's unique ability
to conceive, carry, and give birth to a child.8' However, the dissent
stated that the logic of Danforth and Casey "flatly contradicts the
Georgia Supreme Court's reasoning that the State must ignore these

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
434 U.S. 246 (1978).
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
119 S. Ct. at 2413 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

72. Id.
73. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
74. 119 S. Ct. at 2413 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Miller, 523 U.S. at 445) (citation omitted) (alteration by court).

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
119 S. Ct. at 2413 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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efforts when deciding whether she, as opposed to the father, is entitled
to inherit from the deceased child's estate.8 2
The dissenting opinion concluded with a final reason why the Court
should have granted certiorari: besides the fact that "[t]his Court
routinely reviews state courts' decisions invalidating state or local laws
on federal constitutional grounds," the State "filed an amicus brief
urging the Court to uphold the constitutionality of section 53-2-4(b)(2),
and its views should affect our decision whether to exercise jurisdiction."' In addition, the dissenting Justices noted that the "importance
of the issue cannot be gainsaid. " " Because several states have the
same or a similar statute, the Georgia Supreme Court's decision also
"calls the continued validity of these statutes into doubt." 5
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The Georgia Supreme Court's action, together with the United States
Supreme Court's inactions, has at least two consequences. First, by not
acknowledging the sociological studies that show fathers having
illegitimate children are very likely to abandon their illegitimate
children emotionally, if not financially, and by allowing those fathers to
inherit from their children even if the father has not supported or openly
treated the child as his own, the courts can be seen as encouraging
wrongful parental behavior.8 Without doing any more than establishing that he is the father of the child, a man can now reap the benefits
of siring a child through the inheritance statutes even though the father
did not voluntarily give his child the benefit of a true father. Second,
the United States Supreme Court should have taken the opportunity to
clarify the constitutionality of this statute because other states currently
have the same or a similar statute in effect, and at least one other state
supreme court has found its statute constitutional. 7
Appellant's briefs to both the Georgia Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court presented affidavits of Patrick Fagan, William H.
G. Fitzgerald Fellow in Family and Cultural Issues at The Heritage
Foundation, and State Representative William C. Randall, Chairman of
the Special Judiciary Committee of the Georgia House of Representatives. Appellant asked Mr. Fagan to "render a public policy analysis as

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2414.

86. See Affidavit of Patrick F. Fagan filed with Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Rainey

v. Chever, 119 S. Ct. 2411 (1999) (No. 98-1478).
87. See 119 S. Ct. at 2413-14.
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to whether [the subject] statute is substantially related to achievement
of important governmental objectives.""8 Appellant asked for Representative Randall's affidavit because he was a member of the committee
that sponsored House Bill 251, which was later codified as section 53-24(b)(2).
Mr. Fagan's affidavit pointed to statistics showing a "steady upward
trend in out-of-wedlock births" and noted that the number "of out-ofwedlock births among blacks exceeded 80% in 1995" in parts of the
United States. 9 Mr. Fagan testified through his affidavit that "less
than 10% of fathers of children born out of wedlock had consistently kept
in touch with the mothers and children for even a few months after the
birth out of wedlock, and that the fathers tended to provide financial
support only as required by court order."9 ° His affidavit also pointed
to a "state-by-state analysis of statistics from the FBI Crime Index and
from the National Center for Health Statistics" that "reveal[ed] that
each 10% increase in out-of-wedlock births is associated with a 17%
increase in violent teenage crime."9 ' The affidavit highlighted some of
the adverse social, educational, and economic effects to out-of-wedlock
mothers, fathers, and children.92
Mr. Fagan concluded that men and women are not similarly situated
and that the statute in question treats men and women differently based
upon the "real biological differences between men and women with
regard to child birth and child-rearing."9 3 If the out-of-wedlock mother
chose not to take responsibility for the child, she would be "much more
likely than [the] father[] to be subjected to legal proceedings to place the
[child] in foster care and to terminate [her] parental rights."94 However, a father can walk away from his out-of-wedlock child with little or no
legal ramifications. Mr. Fagan determined that the statute merely
"distinguishes between two categories of men who sire children out of
wedlock"

those who "voluntarily choose ...

to shoulder the other

responsibilities of fatherhood" and those who choose to walk away.9"
Representative Randall's affidavit provided the courts with the
legislative intent and reasoning for placing the additional requirements
on out-of-wedlock fathers and not on out-of-wedlock mothers. Represen-

88. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at app. 10, Rainey v. Chever, 119 S. Ct. 2411 (1999)
(No. 98-1478).
89. Id. at app. 11.
90. Id. at app. 12.
91. Id. at app. 12-13.
92. Id. at app. 12-15.
93. Id. at app. 15.
94. Id. at app. 16.
95. Id. at app. 17.
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ative Randall stated that the Special Judiciary Committee "found no
instances of mothers of children born out of wedlock having little or
nothing to do with their children."9"
[The Special Judiciary Committee] found a widespread problem of
fathers of children born out of wedlock failing or refusing to accept
responsibility with regard to child-rearing, failing or refusing to
develop of [sic] substantial family relationships with their children, and
failing or refusing to provide support except as is compelled by the
courts under threat of going to jail.97
Therefore, the legislation was drafted to prevent these fathers from
"seeking to profit from the death[s] of the[se] child[ren]." ss Noting that
the legislature intended "to distinguish between two categories of fathers
of children born out of wedlock, based upon their conduct," Representative Randall testified that "the state does have a [sic] strong an interest
in discouraging irresponsible conduct by biological fathers."" Representative Randall concluded that a statute "remov[ing] the potential for
men [to reap] a windfall profit from the death of [a] child born out of
wedlock for whom the man accept[ed] no substantial responsibility"
would discourage other men who might be inclined to "irresponsibly
impregnate still more women and girls out of wedlock" because they
knew of "men profiting from the death of a child for whom they had
taken no substantial responsibility." °° Appellant noted that this
scheme is a "sexual lottery ticket."'0 '
The State cited with approval and reprinted portions of the affidavits
of Mr. Fagan and Representative Randall in the amicus curiae brief that
the Georgia Supreme Court directed it to file.'0 2 However, the Georgia
Supreme Court seemed to reject the affiants' findings. 3 Even the
three dissenting Justices of the United States Supreme Court noted the
importance of the State's amicus curiae brief when it stated that "its
views should affect our decision whether to exercise jurisdiction."'

96. Id. at app. 20.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at app. 21-22.
100. Id. at app. 22.
101. Brief of Appellant at 21, Rainey v. Chever, 270 Ga. 519,510 S.E.2d 823 (1999) (No.
S98A1518).
102. See Amicus Brief for the State of Georgia, Rainey v. Chever, 119 S. Ct. 2411 (1999)
(No. 98-1478).
103. 270 Ga. at 519-21, 510 S.E.2d at 824-25.
104. 119 S. Ct. at 2413 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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As to the second consequence of Rainey, the dissenting Justices of the
United States Supreme Court aptly noted that several states have
statutes similar to section 53-2-4.1°5 They stated that the "decision of
the Supreme Court of Georgia, resting on federal constitutional grounds,
calls the continued validity of these statutes into doubt."1
However,
they did not point out that other states have found statutes with
language similar to section 53-2-4 to be constitutional. For example, in
Estate of Scheller v. Pessetto, °7 the court held that Utah's statute,
which substantially mirrors section 53-2-4, is constitutional under both
the state and federal constitutions because it "does not violate equal
protection," is "not unconstitutionally vague," and "does not violate
Utah's constitutional equal rights provision." 08 Relying on Lehr and
Parham,the Utah court concluded that the statute "promotes legitimate
state interests of providing efficient estate administration and promoting
development of meaningful relationships between illegitimate children
and their fathers and is based on situational differences between
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers."'09 Thus, a decision by the
United States Supreme Court would have provided much needed
guidance for the states when interpreting and applying past decisions of
the United States Supreme Court to intestacy statutes dealing with
illegitimate children.
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